The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees' preferences over tasks, and fairness considerations often play a role as well. Team incentives have the potential to curtail the role of these factors in favor of performance -in particular when the incentive plan includes both the leader and the team members. This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to study the effects of such team incentives on task assignment and performance. We introduce team incentives in a random subsets of 108 stores of a Dutch retail chain. We find no effect of the incentive, neither on task assignment nor on performance.
Introduction
In many organisations, employees work in teams that perform a variety of tasks. A team's ultimate performance depends on how well employees perform their tasks as well as on the division of tasks among the employees. For instance, allocating more important tasks to more talented employees will often improve a team's performance. However, in practice, performance considerations are rarely the only determinant of task allocation, in particular when some tasks are more interesting or pleasant than others. In such cases, preferences of team members for tasks may a¤ect the allocation, as well as fairness concerns or seniority. When team managers decide on task allocation, favouritism may play a role as well. The importance of these factors can be diminished by introducing or strengthening incentive pay based on team performance for teams and their managers.
In addition to inducing workers to perform better on their tasks, team incentives may induce teams or their managers to reallocate tasks in a performance-enhancing way.
In this paper, we present the results of a …eld experiment designed to study the e¤ects of team incentive pay on team performance and task allocation in teams. The experiment took place in a retail chain in The Netherlands comprising 108 geographically dispersed stores. We randomly selected 60 stores to participate in a short-term sales tournament.
Each participating sales team competed with two comparable sales teams for a period of six weeks on the basis of sales relative to a pre-determined sales target. Employees and the manager of the best-performing store earned a bonus of 50 euro each, which amounts to more than 3% of monthly employee earnings. During the tournament, participating stores received weekly feedback informing them about the current ranking in their group.
We use administrative sales data to analyse the e¤ects of the team incentive on performance. Furthermore, we conducted surveys among employees and managers of all stores before and after the tournament period to learn about task allocation in stores.
The surveys ask store employees and managers about the importance of several aspects for task allocation in their team, including employee ability, employee preferences over tasks, fairness concerns, seniority, and managerial favouritism. In addition, we collected data on employees' job satisfaction. By conducting identical surveys before and after the tournament in both the treatment and control group, we are able to estimate the e¤ect of the team incentive on task allocation within teams (as perceived by employees) and on job satisfaction. 1 The theoretical predictions are as follows. The team incentive increases the importance of team performance to employees and managers. Consequently, they should have a stronger incentive to exert e¤ort, leading to better performance. Furthermore, team performance should play a more important role in the allocation of tasks among employees. Hence, we predict that employee ability becomes more important in task assignment, while the other considerations (employee preferences, fairness concerns, seniority, and favouritism) become less important. This revised task allocation should also result in better team performance. Job satisfaction may su¤er as workers' individual task preferences play a smaller role in task assignment. On the other hand, some workers'job satisfaction may actually increase as considerations like favoritism and seniority are muted. The overall implications for job satisfaction are thus theoretically unclear.
Our experiment follows the tradition in organizational economics to focus on incentives and contract design. However, by hypothesizing about and collecting detailed data on how leaders assign tasks to employees, we move a step in the direction of the literature on leadership in management and psychology, which allows for a much richer role of leadership than the economics literature (Zehnder et al. 2017 ). In particular, we stress the role of leaders in coordinating employees'complementary actions that jointly determine the team's success. We share this feature with Burgess et al. (2010) , who analyse the introduction of team pay-for-performance at the UK tax authorities. The incentive scheme covered only a part of the tasks that teams are responsible for. The …ndings indicate that team incentives increased performance, part of which can be attributed to a change in task assignment within teams, as managers disproportionately reallocated e¢ cient workers to the incentivised tasks. Two other papers in economics studying task assignment by managers are Bandiera et al. (2007 and ). They introduce incentive pay for managers in a UK fruit farm, making their pay dependent of their subordinates'performance. This induced managers to assign more productive employees to the incentivised task (picking fruit), leading to a substantial increase in productivity.
By contrast, when paid a ‡at wage, managers were more likely to assign this task to employees who were socially connected to them. Hence, providing performance-based incentives to managers reduced favouritism in task assignment. Contrary to these earlier studies, we examine the e¤ects of an incentive scheme that rewards overall team performance, not performance on a subset of tasks. We lack administrative data on individual task assignment and productivity. Instead, we use surveys to assess whether the incentives a¤ect how tasks are allocated, as perceived by the employees. 2 Our results are as follows. We …nd no e¤ect of the team incentive on sales performance. This average treatment e¤ect is fairly precisely estimated. Furthermore, we …nd no evidence supporting the hypothesis that task allocation has changed to enhance performance in treated stores. In particular, we …nd no e¤ect on the importance of employee ability in the allocation of tasks. Nor do employees in treated stores report more often that "the division of tasks is such that the best possible sales performance is achieved".
The average treatment e¤ect on job satisfaction is not statistically signi…cant either.
Together, these results suggest that business continued as usual despite the treatment.
We provide an extensive discussion of possible interpretations of the null results in the …nal section of our paper.
The estimated average treatment e¤ect in this study is at the lower end of the range of estimates in comparable studies in the retail sector. In Delfgaauw et al. (2013 Delfgaauw et al. ( , 2014 Delfgaauw et al. ( , 2015 , we implement comparable team-based tournament incentives schemes across shops of di¤erent retail chains and obtain average treatments e¤ects on performance ranging from 0% to 5% increase in sales. Friebel et al. (2017) implement a (noncompetitive) team incentive based on performance targets in a German bakery chain and …nd an average treatment e¤ect of 3%. Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) …nd a more substantial e¤ect of a tournament incentive implemented among independent retailers of a commodities …rm in which there was substantially more money at stake than in the current study. We deviate from these previous studies in our focus on task allocation within teams. By contrast, earlier studies have looked at how treatment e¤ects relate to the gender composition of the team and gender of the manager (Delfgaauw et al. 2013) , the prospect of participation in further tournament rounds and volatility in performance (Delfgaauw et al. 2015) , the extent to which employees are able to in ‡uence waiting times (Friebel et The relationship between performance-related pay and job satisfaction is the subject of a small literature. With a single exception (Friebel et al. 2017) , the existing evidence is correlational. Heywood and Wei (2006) and Green and Heywood (2008) for highly paid workers but the reverse for lower paid workers. We add to this literature by examining the e¤ect of introducing a short-term team incentive on job satisfaction using an experimental design, allowing for a causal interpretation of our …ndings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the experimental setting and design. In Section 3 we discuss the estimation procedure. Descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4 and the estimation results in Section 5. Section 6 discusses our …ndings and concludes.
Experimental Context and Design

Experimental context
The experiment took place from October 2013 to January 2014 among 108 stores of a retail chain selling lingerie and swimwear in the Netherlands. All stores are companyowned, there are no franchisers. All managers and employees are female. A store has a manager and on average 7 employees. The majority of employees works part-time or on-call.
Employees earn an hourly wage slightly above the legal minimum hourly wage. They can occasionally earn team bonuses during incentive periods that are usually timed to coincide with marketing e¤orts. These bonuses are generally earmarked for team outings. 4 The company's management was interested in conducting this …eld experiment as it wished to explore a more extensive use of incentive pay.
Decisions regarding the product range, pricing, and marketing are made by the retail chain's management. The primary tasks of store sta¤ include advising customers, attending the register, administration, and keeping the displays stocked and tidy. According to the company's management, employees have substantial in ‡uence on store performance, especially through an assertive and commercial attitude when advising customers. Furthermore, within the company it is widely acknowledged that store employees di¤er substantially in their ability to generate sales when advising customers.
The chain's management and the store managers we spoke to considered task allocation to be an important channel through which store managers a¤ect store performance. This anecdotal evidence suggests that, in this retail chain, task allocation matters for team performance, providing a good setting for an experiment on whether team incentives a¤ect task assignment. 4 No such incentive period ran concurrently with our experiment.
The store manager is responsible for sta¢ ng of the store and has the authority to assign tasks to employees. In practice, employees are consulted and can express their preferences. Furthermore, employees typically perform multiple tasks, prioritizing advising customers and attending the register when there are many customers and cleaning and stocking during quiet moments. In the survey we conducted before the experiment, the average response of store managers to the question "I determine the allocation of tasks"equals 6.3 on a 7-point scale ranging from completely disagree (1) to neutral (4) to completely agree (7) . The average response to the question "I monitor whether everyone performs their tasks well" equals 6.4 on the same 7-point scale. Hence, store managers feel that they are in charge of task allocation. The mean response among employees to the statement 'I decide myself which tasks to perform'was 4.3 and their mean response to the statement 'The store manager decides about the allocation of tasks in the store' was 5.2, both on a 7-point Likert scale. This suggests that the store manager coordinates the allocation of tasks, but that employees do have some leeway in deciding which tasks to perform at a given time. Importantly, we also asked employees whether the task allocation in their store achieved the best possible sales performance. The mean response to this statement was 5.2. Taking averages across employees at the store level, Figure 1 gives the distribution of responses across stores. This indicates that while task allocation is catered towards enhancing performance, employees in many stores do see room for improving sales performance through changes in task allocation. We discuss the surveys in more detail in Subsection 2.3.
Experimental Design
We implemented tournaments between subsets of stores over a period of six weeks.
A randomly selected subset of stores was assigned to groups of three stores each; we discuss the assignment procedure at length in subsection 2.4 below. Within these groups, stores competed for a prize. The performance measure in the tournament was a store's cumulative realized sales over the period of six weeks as a percentage of cumulative sales targets. These weekly targets for each store's sales are set by the company's management at the start of the …nancial year, long before we set up the experiment. 5 These targets take into account variation in sales due to e.g. seasonal e¤ects, holidays, and planned marketing e¤orts, as well as store-speci…c factors. In our data, time and store-…xed e¤ects account for 92:7% of the variation in sales targets. Realized sales relative to sales targets is a familiar performance metric to employees. Store managers receive this performance measure on a weekly basis. Let r s;w denote sales revenues realized by store s in week w, and b s;w the sales target for store s in week w. Cumulative performance of The task assignment is such that the best possible sales performance is achieved store s after w weeks is given by
All employees and the manager of the store with the best performance in the group after six weeks received a bonus. Full-time employees received C =50, part-time employees received a bonus proportional to their contract size. The bonus amounts to approximately 2:5% of employees'earnings in a six-week period. Depending on the size of the store and experience, store managers earn about 20 to 50 percent more than employees. Hence, the bonus amounts to 1.7% to 2.1% of store managers'pay in a six-week period. This is comparable to Burgess et al. (2010) , where employees could earn a bonus of about 3% of pay and managers a bonus of either 2% or 4%, depending on the treatment. In Bandiera et al. (2007 Bandiera et al. ( , 2009 ), the bonus was considerably higher. It could reach up to 25% of total compensation, and actual bonus payout was about 7% of total pay.
Out of fairness considerations, the company's management insisted on allowing each store the opportunity to compete. Therefore, we implement tournaments in two periods.
The second tournament period started three weeks after the end of the …rst tournament period. In the …rst period, 60 randomly chosen stores participate while the remaining 48 stores comprised the control group. The relatively large number of stores in the treatment group serves two purposes. First, as we expect the variance of performance to be larger among treatment stores than among control stores during the tournament, a larger treatment group serves to increase the power of our analysis (List et al. 2011 ).
Second, a larger treatment group enables us to have a set of stores compete in both periods, to analyse potential spill-over e¤ects. In the second tournament period, all 48 stores that did not participate in the …rst period were assigned to participate. In addition, we randomly selected 15 stores that did participate in the …rst tournament period to also participate in the second period.
All communication regarding the tournaments was sent through regular company channels using company material. Store personnel was unaware of our involvement in the incentive scheme. Prior to the …rst tournament period, the company's management announced that several incentive events would be held in the near future. Stores were informed that -while each store would participate at least once -they would not necessarily participate in all events. Stores were not informed about an upcoming tournament if they would not be participating. 6 In the communication towards the stores, there was no mentioning of a speci…c interest in task allocation.
The tournaments were announced and explained to participating stores in the week prior to the start of each tournament. The company decided to run the tournaments under the name 'Sexy Super Cup'. 7 Participating stores received a large poster speci…cally designed for this event, which contained the rules of the contest and was supposed to be glued to a wall or door in the backo¢ ce. During the tournament, each week the stores received a small poster with the ranking in their group (see Figure 2 for an example;
the original poster was in Dutch), which could be glued to dedicated spaces on the large poster. This allowed stores to track their (relative) performance during the tournament.
Surveys
We have asked all store employees twice to complete an online survey. The …rst survey was administered prior to the …rst tournament period and the second survey after the …rst tournament period. The two surveys were identical. The goal of the surveys was to measure the importance of di¤erent considerations driving the allocation of tasks in the store, as well as employees'job satisfaction. Invitations to participate in the survey were sent on behalf of Erasmus University Rotterdam to all employees and managers of all 108 stores. The invitation for the …rst survey was sent three weeks before the start of the …rst tournament period, and the invitation for the second survey was sent one week after the end of the …rst tournament period. The invitations included a personal code that allowed us to link survey responses. Employees were given two weeks to complete each 6 However, personnel may in some instances have learned of an ongoing tournament due to contacts with other stores. 7 Pun intended.
survey. In the second week we called stores as a reminder, using a call script. Neither the surveys nor the call script mentioned the tournaments. As an incentive to complete the surveys, one randomly chosen respondent in each wave was awarded with a tablet with a retail value of 150 euro. The following statements are concerned with the task assignment in your store. Task assignment Ability The division of tasks is such that everyone does that which she does best. Preference
The division of tasks is such that everyone does that which she enjoys most.
Seniority
Employees who have been with the store longer carry out more pleasant tasks.
Fairness
The divisions of tasks is fair. Favouritism
Friends of the manager carry out more pleasant tasks.
E¢ ciency
The division of tasks is such that the best possible sales performance is achieved.
Job satisfaction How satis…ed are you with your job at ...
The statements on task assignment and e¢ ciency came with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 'Completely disagree' to 'Compeletely agree'. The question on job satisfaction came with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 'Very dissatis…ed'to 'Very satis…ed'.
In the surveys, respondents had to evaluate statements using a 7-point Likert scale.
In particular, we asked employees about the importance of employee ability, employee preferences, fairness concerns, favouritism, and seniority in the determination of their store's task allocation in the past two months. Furthermore, we asked whether the store's task assignment is such that the best possible sales performance is achieved.
These questions are presented in Table 1 .
Conducting the survey before and after the …rst tournament period among both …rst-period treatment and …rst-period control stores allows us to analyse the e¤ects of the tournament treatment on task allocation (as perceived by employees) and job satisfaction. We did not conduct a third wave of surveys after the second tournament period, as at that point all stores would have been treated at least once. This makes it impossible to distinguish between time-speci…c determinants of task allocation and changes in task allocation as a result of the treatment.
Store managers and store employees received similar surveys, where the wording in the survey for managers was slightly altered to re ‡ect their speci…c role in allocating tasks. 8 Managers may have stronger strategic or image concerns in answering survey questions regarding task allocation than employees. Therefore, in the analysis we only use the survey responses of employees. 9 Response rates among employees were 34.5%
(258 out of 747) on the …rst survey and 18.5% (140 out of 739) on the second survey.
At the store level, we have at least one respondent for 82.4% of stores (89 out of 108)
in the …rst survey and for 61.1% (66 out of 108) in the second survey. We will discuss possible selection bias in Section 4.
Assignment procedure
For the …rst tournament period, we used a strati…ed random assignment procedure to create balanced treatment and control groups in terms of task allocation and prior performance, as follows. First, for each of the 89 stores with at least one respondent in the …rst survey, we calculated the average response to the statement 'the division of tasks is such that everyone does that which she does best', measuring the importance of employee ability in allocating tasks. We ranked these stores based on this score. We added one randomly chosen store from the set of 19 stores with no survey response, at a randomly chosen rank. From this ranking of 90 stores, we created 5 strata of 18 stores where the top 18 stores constituted one stratum, as well as stores ranked 19 to 36, and so on. The remaining 18 stores with no survey response constituted a sixth stratum.
Within each of these six strata, we ranked stores based on average weekly performance (sales relative to sales target) over the 36 weeks prior to the experiment. We divided each stratum into two substrata constituting the top 9 and bottom 9 stores in terms of prior performance. Finally, we randomly selected …ve stores out of the 9 stores in each of the 12 substrata to participate in the …rst tournament period. Hence, the treatment group comprises 60 stores and the control group contains 48 stores.
In the second tournament period, all stores in the …rst-period control group participated in the tournament because the companies' management wanted all stores to participate in at least one tournament. In addition, we selected 15 stores from the …rst-period treatment group. We randomly selected one …rst-period treatment store from each of the 12 substrata created in the …rst-period assignment procedure and added 3 more stores randomly chosen out of the remaining …rst-period treatment stores. The remaining …rst-period treatment stores did not participate in the second period competition.
In assigning the participating stores to groups of three stores in the tournament, we aimed at maximising the level of competition by grouping the stores together on the basis of past performance. For the …rst tournament period, we ranked the participating stores by cumulative sales over 36 weeks prior to the experiment. Next, we grouped the three best performing stores together, as well numbers 4 to 6, and so on. To reduce possible sabotage opportunities, we made in total 4 adjustments to prevent that stores from the same regional area (Dutch province) were grouped together. For the second tournament period, we followed a similar procedure. We ranked the participating stores based on cumulative past performance over 45 weeks prior to the tournament period and divided them into groups of three similarly performing stores. This time, we had to make 8 adjustments to prevent stores within the same regional area from competing with one another. Upon informing the companies' management of the assignment, we learned that two stores, which had not participated in the …rst tournament period, would be closed for refurbishment during the second tournament period. We drop these stores' observations during and after their refurbishment from the analysis. We did not replace these two stores in the tournament, so that in two second-period tournament groups only two stores competed. 10 Hence, 61 stores participated in the second tournament period.
Estimation
We estimate the e¤ect of participating in the experiment on weekly performance, task allocation, and job satisfaction using OLS with period-…xed e¤ects and either store-or individual-…xed e¤ects. The average treatment e¤ect on stores'performance is estimated by
where Y s;w is weekly performance of store s in week w, measured as actual sales revenue over targeted sales: Y s;w = r s;w b s;w . Store and week-…xed e¤ects are given by s and w , respectively. T s;w is a dummy denoting whether store s is participating in a tournament in week w, so that measures the average treatment e¤ect. The error term " s;w is clustered at the store level to account for possible serial correlation. 11 We will also estimate the e¤ects separately for the …rst and second tournament period.
For the …rst tournament period, stores have been randomly allocated to either treatment or control, implying that in expectation the control group provides a reliable counterfactual for the performance of the treatment stores in the tournament. In the second tournament period, however, all non-participating stores have participated in the …rst period. If participation leads to carry-over e¤ects, for instance due to learning or fatigue, these stores do not constitute a proper control group for the stores that compete for the …rst time in the second period. We use the 15 stores that participate in both waves to analyse possible carry-over e¤ects. To prevent short-term carry-over e¤ects from a¤ect-ing the estimates, the three weeks in between the two tournament periods are excluded from the analysis. 12 Estimation of the incentive e¤ect on job satisfaction and task allocation is based on the …rst tournament period, as the surveys were administered before and after this period. We estimate the e¤ect of the team incentive both at the individual employee level and at the store level. For the analysis at the store level, we use the average response on the survey items across all respondents employed in a given store. The average treatment e¤ect is estimated by
where R i;t is the survey response of unit i (individual or store) in survey t (before or after the …rst tournament period). Observation unit-…xed e¤ects and survey-…xed e¤ects are given by i and t , respectively. T i;t is a dummy that takes value 1 for responses on the survey after the …rst-period tournament if the store (of individual) i was part of the …rst-period treatment group. Hence, measures the average treatment e¤ect. Finally " i;t is the error term, clustered at the store level.
The store level is the natural level of analysis, as we randomized at the store level.
Furthermore, task assignment a¤ects the team as a whole. However, there are three caveats in analyzing the results at the store level. First, for a given store the respondents to the …rst survey may di¤er from the respondents to the second survey. Insofar as selection into and out of the survey is correlated with assignment to the …rst-period treatment group, this may bias the results. Below, we analyse the self-selection of employees into answering the …rst and second survey and …nd no indication of selection related to …rst-period assignment. Second, stores are given the same weight in the 1 1 For ease of interpretation, we estimate the incentive e¤ect on weekly performance as opposed to cumulative performance (as given by (1)). This is inconsequential for the estimation results since (1) determines performance by comparing total sales to total targeted sales over the tournament period. Thus sales sta¤ cannot strategically focus e¤orts on apparantly "easy" weeks as a sale counts equally towards performance regardless of the week in which it occurs. 1 2 Including these weeks in the analysis does not in ‡uence the results.
analysis independent of the number or fraction of employees that answered a given survey.
Weighing stores by the number of respondents (in either the …rst or the second survey)
does not a¤ect the estimates. Third, store-level averages mask within-store di¤erences in responses. Among the questions on task allocation in the …rst survey, the fraction of total variation explained by store-…xed e¤ects ranges from 0.34 to 0.44. Hence, there is sizable heterogeneity across stores, but also considerable di¤erences within stores. Therefore, we also present the average treatment e¤ects estimated at the individual employee level, accounting for individual-…xed e¤ects.
Descriptive statistics
We have weekly data on store performance covering a year starting in February 2013.
In addition, prior to the …rst tournament period we received personnel data of all stores.
This includes information on employees'age, tenure, contractual hours (measure in fulltime equivalent, fte), and position. Figure 3 depicts weekly targeted and actual sales averaged across stores for the 52 weeks in our dataset. Sales is highly volatile, but most of it is predicted by the company's management as sales and targeted sales follow by and large the same pattern. Normalized by mean weekly sales over the whole period Descriptive statistics are given in Table 2 . The …rst column shows that, on average, stores'sales fell short of sales targets by about 5 percent. Stores employ on average 8 individuals (including the manager), of whom two work on-call. Most regular employees work part-time. All employees and managers are female. Table 2 also reports these statistics separately for the treatment group and the control group in the …rst tournament period. This shows that the two groups are similar in terms of past performance and personnel characteristics. The only exception is average contract size ('fte') which is slightly but signi…cantly larger in the control stores. Figure 4 depicts average performance separated by …rst-period assignment. This shows that both prior to and during the tournament periods performance in both groups was similar. stores with sta¤ survey data for the …rst and second survey, respectively, and 60 stores for which we have respondents for both surveys. Due to some item non-response, the exact number of stores with at least one response varies a bit across questionnaire items.
The left-hand side of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the …rst employee survey, conducted before the …rst tournament period. On average, employees indicate that fairness considerations and employee ability are the most important drivers of task assignment in their store. Employee preferences matter to a smaller extent while favouritism and seniority are not perceived as important drivers of task assignment. We …nd limited di¤erences across …rst-period treatment and control stores. Only favouritism is perceived as slightly more important by employees in treatment stores as compared to employees in control stores (p-value 0.098). The average level of job satisfaction is also similar across treatment and control. 13 , , and indicate that the di¤erence between treatment stores and control stores in a given survey is statistically signi…cant at the p < :1 level, p < :05 level, and p < :01 level, respectively. Table 1 gives the exact wording of the questionnaire items. The exact number of stores varies across questionnaire items due to item non-response. Table 4 presents correlations between the store averages on the main items in the …rst survey. There is a rather strong positive correlation between the perceived importance of employee ability and the perceived importance of employee preferences in task allocation as well as between the perceived importance of seniority and favouritism. Not surprisingly, the perceived importance of favouritism and seniority both correlate negatively with fairness considerations. Interestingly, the extent to which task allocation is geared towards sales performance ('e¢ ciency') is most strongly related to fairness considerations, and relates positively (negatively) to the importance of employee ability and employee preferences (favouritism and seniority) in task allocation. This could re ‡ect that people are more productive under a fair task allocation. Another interpretation is that an e¢ cient allocation is considered to be fair. Job satisfaction is most strongly related to the perceived importance of fairness and is also positively correlated with the importance of employee ability and employee preferences. The right-hand side of Table 3 gives the outcomes of the second survey, conducted after the …rst tournament period. Compared to the …rst survey, job satisfaction is somewhat higher but not speci…cally among the treatment stores. The di¤erence in the perceived importance of favouritism in task allocation between …rst-period treatment and control stores is no longer present in the second survey. We do …nd that employee preferences are considered less important for task assignment among stores that did participate in a …rst-period tournament than among stores that did not participate.
A concern in evaluating the e¤ects of the team incentive on job satisfaction and task allocation is that only part of the employees completed the surveys, which may lead to selection e¤ects. When this selection is related to stores' assignment to the treatment or control group, it yields biased estimates of the treatment e¤ects. For the …rst survey, self-selection is unlikely to be problematic. At that point, employees
were not yet aware of the upcoming experiment, so that self-selection cannot be based on assignment to treatment or control. Panel A in Table A .1 in the Appendix shows that …rst-survey respondents are older than non-respondents, have a longer history with the company, and work more hours, suggesting that employees with a stronger connection to the …rm were more likely to complete the survey. Separating this by …rst-period assignment, we …nd indeed that across the treatment and control groups a comparable set of employees Aggregating the survey data to store level, Table A .2 shows that stores with and without respondents to the …rst survey are comparable in terms of observable characteristics. For the second survey, we do …nd some di¤erences between stores with and without survey respondents. Stores that performed relatively well before the experiment, that are headed by an older and more experienced manager, and that have a larger team are more likely to have at least one employee responding to the survey. Comparing the di¤erences between stores with and without survey across the treatment and the control group, we …nd that these patterns arise in both groups (not reported for brevity). Hence, both the individual-level and the store-level data show that self-selection into the …rst and second survey appears to be unrelated to treatment assignment.
Self-selection can also be related to stores'task allocation. Again, this type of selfselection is most problematic when it di¤ers between stores in the treatment and the control group. As assignment to treatment and control was strati…ed by the response to the …rst survey, self-selection into the …rst survey is unlikely to a¤ect our estimated treatment e¤ects. Furthermore, we can analyse whether self-selection into the second survey conditional on …rst-survey responses di¤ers between treatment and control stores.
Panel A in Table A .3 reports the average response to the key questions in the …rst survey, comparing employees who only responded to the …rst survey with employees who responded to both surveys, separated by …rst-period assignment. This shows no substantial di¤erences between employees who only responded to the …rst survey with employees who responded to both surveys. None of these di¤erences di¤ers signi…cantly between the treatment group and the control group. Panel B in Table A.3 reports average responses to the second survey comparing employees who answered only to the second survey with employees who answered both surveys. In the control group, employees who completed both surveys indicate signi…cantly higher importance of seniority and favouritism in their stores'task allocation compared to employees who only respond to the second survey. A similar, but less pronounced pattern arises in the treatment group.
Comparing these di¤erences across the treatment and control group, only for ability we …nd a statistically signi…cant di¤erence (p-value 0.06). Employees in the control group who answered only to the second survey indicate lower importance of ability than employees who answered both surveys, while the reverse holds in the treatment group.
Assuming that the non-participation of respondents in the …rst survey is unrelated to treatment assignment, this implies that we may underestimate the treatment e¤ect on the importance of ability in task allocation in the estimations at the employee level.
In Table A .4, we report similar …gures aggregated at store level, comparing stores where at least one employee answered to each of the surveys with stores where none of the employees responded to one of the surveys. At the store level, we …nd that none of the di¤erences between these types of stores di¤ers signi…cantly between the treatment and the control group. All together, the available evidence suggests that self-selection into the surveys does not a¤ect our estimates.
Results
The …rst column of Table 5 gives the results of estimating (2) . The estimated treatment e¤ect of participating in a tournament is a reduction in performance by 0.6 percentage points. This e¤ect is precisely estimated, with a standard error of 0.8 percentage points.
Hence, the 95 percent con…dence interval of the average treatment e¤ect lies between -2.1 and 1.0 percentage point. In Column 2 of Table 5 , we separate the average treatment e¤ect by tournament period. In both periods, the estimated e¤ect is small and statistically insigni…cant, and the di¤erence between the estimated treatment e¤ects for the two periods is small as well. In the third column, we estimate the e¤ect of participating in the second tournament period separately for the 15 stores who had also participated in the …rst period, to establish whether there are carry-over e¤ects of participating in the …rst tournament to performance during the second tournament period. We …nd no statistically signi…cant carry-over e¤ect, suggesting that having participated in the …rst tournament period does not a¤ect stores' response during the second tournament period. 14 The absence of a positive treatment e¤ect is not due to low power. Given our di¤erence-in-di¤erence design, the power of our analysis depends on serial correlation across observations within stores (Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Using the period before the experiment took place (weeks 1 -36), we regress performance on store-and week-…xed e¤ects (as we also do in the main analysis). The residuals of this regression have a standard deviation of 0.12, as well as an estimated …rst-order auto-correlation of 0.19
and e¤ectively no higher-order auto-correlation. We are not aware of an exact way to determine the power of an analysis in the presence of serial correlation. It is possible to give upper and lower bounds, though. In the absence of correlation across observations within stores, our design would allow us to detect an e¤ect of 1.9 percentage point with a power of 0.8. On the other hand, if all observations within stores would have a 0.19 correlation, we could detect an e¤ect of 3.3 percentage points with 0.8 power. As only a small subset of observations within stores are correlated, the power of our analysis will be closer to the former than to the latter. 15 1 4 Within a tournament period, there is limited variation in the estimated treatment e¤ect across weeks. In the …rst (second) half of the …rst tournament period, the estimated treatment e¤ect is -1.8% (1.5%). In the …rst (second) half of the second tournament period, the estimated treatment e¤ect is -0.2% (-1.3%). None of these coe¢ cients di¤ers signi…cantly from zero. 1 5 As shown by Bertrand et al. (2004) , clustering standard errors at store level corrects for any serial correlation within stores. Consistent with the presence of weak serial correlation in the data, clustering increases the standard errors of the estimated treatment e¤ects to a limited extent. An alternative way to handle serial correlation is to remove the time dimension from the data. Hence, we collapse our data into three periods, by taking average store performance before the experiment, during the …rst Despite the random assignment, it could be that relatively many of the stores that participated in the …rst tournament period experienced a positive shock to performance just before that period. During the tournament period, performance may have moved back to normal levels, giving rise to a downward bias in the estimated treatment e¤ect.
To assess this possibility, we pretend a tournament took place in the period before the …rst real tournament, i.e. in weeks 31 to 36 in our data-set (see Figure 4) . 16 Thereto, we construct a dummy that takes value 1 in these six weeks for all stores that take part in the …rst tournament period. Column 4 of Table 5 gives the results of estimating the e¤ect of this 'placebo-treatment', dropping all weeks afterwards. The estimated e¤ect is very close to zero. Hence, the stores that participated in the …rst tournament period did not experience a positive shock to performance in the weeks before the tournament.
The absence of a positive average treatment e¤ect on performance does not necessarily imply that the team incentive did not a¤ect behaviour of managers and employees.
The team incentive may have induced them to try out new ways of improving performance, for instance by making changes to task assignment in stores. Such attempts could be successful in some stores but fail in others. If so, we would observe an average treatment e¤ect close to zero accompanied by a relatively large standard error. Comparing the standard errors on the actual treatment in Column 2 with the standard error on the placebo-treatment in Column 4 (which are all based on six-week periods), we …nd that the standard errors on the actual treatment are only slightly higher. Hence, the zero average treatment e¤ect does not mask a large increase in the heterogeneity of store performance. 17 Next, we use the survey data to assess whether employees perceived a change in task allocation in the …rst tournament period in response to the treatment. Table 6 gives the estimated e¤ects of participating in a tournament in the …rst period on task allocation within teams, estimated at the store level. In contrast to our predictions, we do not …nd that our treatment increased the importance of employee ability in allocating tasks. The point estimate is negative, but not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. For the other considerations, we also …nd negative point estimates, all of them insigni…cant except for the importance of employee preferences in task allocation. Estimating these e¤ects at the individual employee level yields a similar picture, as presented in Table   7 . Summarising, while the reduced emphasis on fairness, favouritism, and in particular employee preferences in allocating tasks is in line with our predictions, this should have been accompanied by an increased emphasis on employee ability. Instead we …nd an insigni…cant negative e¤ect. Overall, our …ndings suggest that the introduction of team experimental period, and during the second experimental period. Running the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation using only these three periods, we obtain very similar results: the estimated e¤ect of the treatment equals -0.004, with a standard error of 0.008. 1 6 We leave out the week before the …rst tournament period (week 37), as that may pick up an e¤ect of the announcement of the tournament. 1 7 All results discussed carry over when we focus only on the e¤ects in the …rst week or the …rst three weeks of each treatment period.
incentives had little e¤ect on the allocation of tasks within the teams. 18 Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Dependent variables measured on a 7-point Likert scale, see Table 1 for the exact wording of the survey questions.
and indicate that the coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the p < :1 level and p < :05 level, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Dependent variables measured on a 7-point Likert scale, see Table 1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. and indicate that the coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the p < :1 level and p < :05 level, respectively. Table 8 reports the estimated e¤ects of the treatment on employees'job satisfaction at the store level and at the worker level. The …rst and third column show that the average treatment e¤ect is small and statistically insigni…cant. This average treatment e¤ect may mask heterogeneity across treated stores, in particular between stores that won their tournament and stores that did not win. However, we cannot estimate the e¤ect of winning a tournament by simply including a dummy for stores that won their tournament, as performing relatively well may also a¤ect job satisfaction in the absence of an tournament incentive. Hence, in order to di¤erentiate between the e¤ects of winning the tournament and the e¤ect of attaining relatively high performance, we determine 'winners'and 'losers'of a pseudo-competition among stores that were part of the control group in the …rst tournament period. The pseudo-competition was conducted as follows.
We assigned the control stores to groups of three in the same manner as we did with the treatment stores for the actual tournament. Next, we determined for each group of control stores the 'winning'store, based on stores'cumulative performance during the …rst tournament period. The second and fourth column of Table 8 give the treatment e¤ect for winning and non-winning stores separately. The …rst coe¢ cient gives the treatment e¤ect on non-winning stores, which is statistically insigni…cant both in the store-level estimation and in the worker-level estimation. Hence, participating in a tournament without winning it does not a¤ect job satisfaction signi…cantly compared to stores that did not participate and performed relatively poor as well. The second coe¢ cient shows that job satisfaction goes down in control stores that outperformed two similar control stores during the tournament period, and signi…cantly so in the store-level estimation.
One explanation is that the higher performance is due to higher employee e¤ort. Winning an actual tournament mitigates this e¤ect, as seen by the third coe¢ cient, although the e¤ects are not statistically signi…cant. Standard errors clustered at the store level in parentheses.
Dependent variable measured on a 7-point Likert scale, see Table 1 for the exact wording of the survey question. and indicate that the coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the p < :1 level and p < :05 level, respectively.
Discussion
Overall, our results show that the introduction of the team incentive neither a¤ected team performance nor task assignment within teams. These results are in contrast to the results of earlier studies in the literature. An important question is: why? One way to address this question is to compare studies along important dimensions, and we will do so in the remainder of this section. However, before we delve into this, we would like to stress that the number of existing empirical studies providing causal estimates on the e¤ects of team incentives is still quite small. In building up a body of evidence, it should be no surprise to sometimes …nd contrasting evidence (Antonakis 2017).
Our result on the e¤ect of team incentives on task assignment is in contrast to average treatment e¤ect. 20 1 9 While the bonus in our …eld experiment is equal to about 2.5% of earnings over a 6-week period and paid to a third of the participating employees (i.e. those of the winning store in a group of three stores), in Delfgaauw et al. (2013) employees could earn a bonus of 3.8% of earnings over a 6-week period, but this bonus was paid only to a …fth of the participating employees as stores competed in groups of …ve stores. However, the bonus scheme in that …eld experiment also included a bonus of 1.9% for the employees of the runner-up. Note, however, that Delfgaauw et al. (2013) also studied a treatment where stores compete in groups of …ve without any monetary prizes, yielding e¤ects on performance of similar size. In Delfgaauw et al. (2014) , employees could earn a bonus of 5% of monthly pay when the store would outperform a benchmark by a small margin and a bonus of 10% when outperforming the benchmark by a large margin. It turned out to be hard to qualify for the bonus: less than 11% of the stores earned a bonus, with half of these winning the low bonus. In Delfgaauw et al. (2015) , teams entered elimination tournaments lasting a maximum of two times four weeks, with expected earnings of about 2% of monthly earnings, with prize money ranging from 1.2% to 6% of monthly earnings. Lastly, in Friebel et al. (2017) , about 40% of the employees received a bonus of on average 4% at least once, implying an increase in total wage compensation of about 2%. We conclude that, by and large, the strength of the monetary incentives in these closely related studies is comparable to those in our study. Moreover, there is no clear relation between the strength of the incentive and the performance e¤ect, which ranges from a null …nding in Delfgaauw et al. (2014) , to an increase in sales growth of about 5 to 7 percentage points in Delfgaauw et al. (2013) , a 1,5% increase in the average number of products per customer in Delfgaauw et al. (2015) , to a 3% increase in sales in Friebel et al. (2017) . According to the company's management, the employees were actively engaged in the tournament. In some stores, the weekly rankings were eagerly awaited. However, the company's management perceived that many employees faced di¢ culties translating their engagement into higher sales, possibly due to a lack of skills to recognize and act on sales opportunities. Arguably, if employees are uncertain about how to increase performance, incentives may have little e¤ect, at least in the short-run. After the current experiment, the company decided to invest in commercial training of its employees.
Furthermore, it adopted an incentive scheme based on individual performance, which (unfortunately for us) was implemented in all stores at once. Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
A Appendix
The number of observations varies due to partial missing data.
, , and indicate that the di¤erence in means between non-respondents and respondents within a group is statistically signi…cant at the p < :1 level, p < :05 level, and p < :01 level, respectively.
None of the di¤erences between non-respondents and respondents di¤ers signi…cantly across the treatment and control group at the 0.1 level. Means of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
Comparing employees with and without responses on a given survey, , , and indicate that the di¤erence in means is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the p < :1 level, p < :05 level, and p < :01 level, respectively. Means of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
Comparing stores with and without responses on a given survey, , , and indicate that the di¤erence in means is statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the p < :1 level, p < :05 level, and p < :01 level, respectively.
